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Abstract: Tracing is widely understood to be the process of demonstrating that two rights are 
connected through an exchange, such that a claim to the right given up can be transmitted to 
the right acquired. This has been termed “exchange-product tracing”, and – though its core case 
is the unauthorised substitution of a trust right – it is also thought that a bank transfer exemplifies 
a rights-exchange. I argue here that this is a mistake: a bank transfer does not involve a 
substitution of the kind envisaged by exchange product tracing. Rather, the process that we have 
called “tracing money” through a bank transfer involves two steps: (i) converting bank money, 
by artifice, into an asset independent of the underlying account; (ii) following that asset from 
one location to another. Together, I call these steps “dummy asset tracing”. 
In this article, I show that the twin steps of dummy asset tracing have led us to increase 
the ambit of third party liability at law and in equity: by simulating cash transfers, innocent bank 
payees have been made liable to claimants with whom they did not transact, and of whom they 
were wholly unaware. I argue that the normative foundations for dummy asset tracing are weak, 
and that there is authority and appetite for an approach that focuses more closely upon the 
defendant’s proximity to the relevant injustice: if a defendant is liable for sums paid to her by 
someone other than the claimant, it is either because she actuated or participated in a breach of 
duty owed to the claimant, or because she is the counterparty to a defective transaction effected 
by the claimant’s agent.  
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
Since at least 2001, it has been widely accepted that tracing is the process of 
demonstrating that two rights are connected through an exchange, such that a claim 
to the right given up can be transmitted to the right acquired. This has been termed 
“exchange-product tracing”, and its core case is the unauthorised substitution of a 
trust right: if T, who holds R on trust for B, swaps it for R2 in excess of her authority, 
B can claim R2 as the traceable proceeds of R. It is also thought that a bank transfer 
exemplifies such a substitution: if T, who holds account R on trust for B, diverts 
trust funds from R to the account of a third party, X, X receives and can be made 
accountable for the traceable proceeds of B’s prior claim. This is important: almost 
all putative instances of tracing involve one or more such transfers.  
I argue here that a bank transfer does not involve a substitution of the kind 
envisaged by exchange product tracing. Rather, the process that we have called 
“tracing money” through a bank transfer involves two steps: (i) converting bank 
money, by artifice, into an asset independent of the underlying account; (ii) 
following that asset from one location to another. Together, I call these steps 
“dummy asset tracing”: exchange product tracing is the process of linking two rights 
through an exchange by a single person; dummy asset tracing is the process of 
pursuing a notional asset (thing or right) from one person to another.  
In the first part of this article, I describe the orthodox account of exchange-
product tracing, and argue that we should treat bank transfers as a case apart from 
unauthorised substitution. In the second, I explain how we have substantiated the 
connection between the claimant from whom bank money has been misdirected, 
and the third party to whom it has been paid. I call this “dummy asset tracing”, and 
I show that it manifests differently at law and in equity: in equity, the claimant 
follows a notional right into the hands of the defendant; at law, the claimant follows 
a notional physical cash asset. 
In the third part of this article, I explain how dummy asset tracing has 
influenced the development of common law claims in unjust enrichment, and 
equitable claims against third parties in knowing receipt and for breach of trust. I 
show that, by pinning liability upon the defendant’s putative receipt of an asset to 
which the claimant had a prior claim (at law or in equity), we have come to replicate 
the conditions for and consequences of cash transfers in bank payments cases, 
thereby increasing the ambit of third party liability. By means of dummy asset 
tracing, an innocent payee may be held liable to a claimant with whom she did not 
transact, and of whom she was wholly unaware. 
In the final part of this article, I argue that the normative foundations for 
dummy asset tracing are weak, and that there is authority and appetite for an 
approach that focuses more closely upon the defendant’s proximity to the relevant 
injustice. I argue that, if a defendant is liable for sums paid to her by someone other 
than the claimant, it is either because she actuated or participated in a breach of duty 
owed to the claimant, or because she is the counterparty to a defective transaction 
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effected by the claimant’s agent. In this way, we are able to limit the range of 
circumstances in which a third party can be held liable for bank money 
misappropriated. 
 
 
II.EXCHANGE PRODUCT TRACING AND BANK TRANSFERS 
 
EXCHANGE PRODUCT TRACING 
 
The following Example 1 is an iteration of tracing’s central case: 
 
Example 1: T, trustee, holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T buys 
with it a bottle of wine, without B’s authority. 
 
Although opinions differ as to the logic of any claim that results from such 
facts, there are two clear facets to the orthodox tracing thesis: (i) tracing is the 
process of identifying title to the bottle of wine as the exchange product of title to 
the note (the evidential function);1 and (ii) this process of identification plays a role 
(though perhaps it does not complete the justificatory story) in permitting the 
claimant to transfer her claim from title to the note to title to the bottle of wine (the 
relational function).2 As Smith puts it: 
 
The fundamental idea underlying tracing is that sometimes, for certain 
legal purposes, one asset stands in the place of another. A claim which 
could have been made in relation to the original asset is allowed in 
relation to the new asset… Tracing is the process which can allow the 
transmission of that claim to the new asset.3 
 
This has been termed “exchange product tracing”.4  
 
Smith argues that the way in which the claimant (B) establishes a connection 
between the trust right (R) and its product (R2) is by identifying some feature of R 
that continues to exist throughout the exchange, which feature he labels “value”: 
                                                      
1 ‘Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, 127 (Lord Millett): ‘Tracing is the process of identifying a new asset 
as the substitute for the old’, cited in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638, 1461 by Lewison J 
for the conclusion that tracing is a ‘process not a remedy’. In Armstrong v Winnington [2012] EWHC 10 
(Ch) Stephen Morris QC called it ‘a means, or process, of identifying an asset as being a substitute for an 
asset originally held by the claimant’, at [65]. 
2 It brings about ‘the transmission of a claimant's property rights from one asset to its traceable proceeds’ 
Foskett v McKeown (Lord Millett) 127. See also NABB Brothers Limited v Lloyds Bank International (Guernsey) 
Limited [2005] EWHC 405 (Ch) [75] (Lawrence Collins J) and Armstrong v Winnington [81] (Stephen Morris 
QC). 
3 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (OUP 1997). 
4 C Rotherham, ‘Property and Justice’ in M Kramer (ed), Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (Palgrave 
Macmillan) 174, fn 133; B. Fitzgerald, ‘Tracing at Law, the Exchange Product Theory and Ignorance as 
an Unjust Factor in the Law of Unjust Enrichment ’ (1994) 13 University of Tasmania Law Review 117. 
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The defendant acquired the value inherent in the new asset with the 
value inherent in the old asset. That is why we say that we trace value: 
it is the only constant that exists before, through and after the 
substitution through which we trace. It exists in a different form after 
the substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new asset.5 
 
I have argued elsewhere that this is misleading – that it has, in fact, misled courts 
seeking to apply principles of tracing.6 “Value”, in tracing, is the susceptibility of R 
to exchange: when T acquires R2 with R, transferring R to X and taking R2 for 
herself, she exploits the exchange potential inherent in R. Exchange potential cannot 
move from R to R2: the result of the translation is that X is now in a position to 
exploit the exchange potential of R.  
Yet, there is one element of continuity present in any rights-exchange, which is 
essential to its characterisation as such. As Smith puts it: “the only connection between 
the old and the new asset is the exchange; that is, the substitution of one for the 
other by some person”.7 That feature of Example 1 which allows us to show that title 
to the bottle of wine is the substitute of title to the £10 note, and so to make good 
the assertion of tracing’s first facet, is T’s role as the agent of exchange: T gives up 
title to the note (R) and acquires title to the wine (R2) in its place.  
We rarely dwell on T’s role in exchange product tracing. Instead, we emphasise 
that R2 “is the potential subject matter of a claim” because it is the substitute for R, 
“which was itself the subject matter of a claim”.8 But what makes Example 1 a 
compelling case for rights-transmission (the relational function) is not only B’s initial 
claim to R; it is also the fact that T was situated at the opposite end of that claim. 
Prior to exchange, T was liable to B for title to the note (R). If T exploits the 
exchange potential of R, acquiring title to the wine (R2) in exchange, she puts it 
outside her power to deliver R to B. Whichever conceptual tools we use to clothe 
this more precisely,9 the peculiar role of exchange product tracing is to allow B to 
claim R2, thereby treating T’s liability for R2 as the best proxy for T’s liability for R. 
It is in this sense that B’s claim to R is “represented by” a claim to R2.10 Thus, 
exchange product tracing demands that a single actor – T – give up and receive the 
relevant rights; thus it permits B, without more, to transpose her claim.  
 
                                                      
5 Smith 119. Birks, too, wrote that ‘a person who sets out on a tracing exercise aims to show that the 
value of an asset was used to obtain another’ P. Birks, ‘Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing 
and Claiming’ (1997) 11 TLI 2, 4. 
6 T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, Value and Transactions’ (2016) 79 MLR 381; See now C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. 
Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell) Chapter 7. 
7 Smith 134. 
8 Ibid 6. 
9 This does not commit us to a particular view of the reason for liability. We can clothe this in various ways: 
the best way to remedy breach of trust; T’s liability for R2 follows from T’s primary fiduciary liability to 
account for rights acquired; T would be unjust enriched by R2 if B were not allocated a claim. 
10 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); [2005] Ch 281. 
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EXCHANGE PRODUCT TRACING AND BANK TRANSFERS 
 
Although many texts treat Example 1 as tracing’s central case, the vast majority of 
tracing cases involve a set of facts more akin to the following Example 2: 
 
Example 2: T, a trustee, holds an account on trust for B. T transfers 
£10 from the trust account to that of a third party, X, without B’s 
authority.  
 
In these cases, the principles of tracing are used in the same way, to 
demonstrate that X’s account (R2) is the traceable product of the trust account (R).11 
The present editors of Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment put it thus: “it is 
well accepted that it is possible to trace through inter-account bank transfers, so as 
to identify the credit to the transferee’s account as the product of the debit to the 
paying customer’s account, whether the transfer is “in-house” or “inter-bank”.12 
Where one or more accounts are interposed between R and R2, B must show that 
there was a “direct chain of substitutions whereby the claimant's property was 
exchanged for another asset”.13  
There are, in fact, various problems with identifying a rights-exchange of the 
requisite kind in Example 2.14 The first is that there have been various arguments 
to the effect that a bank payment does not involve a loss and acquisition of rights 
at all. In Evans v European Bank,15 Spigelman CJ considered that a bank transfer from 
one account to another could not constitute a rights-exchange, because the 
transferor account – the right putatively substituted – “always existed and still 
exists”:16 an account holder has a single claim to whatever is the present total of her 
account, which claim remains in her hands following the alleged substitution.  
I do not think it possible to determine whether, as a matter of principle, 
Spigelman CJ’s conclusion is superior to an alternative that would recognise a rights-
exchange from the facts of a bank transfer.17 Whether a bank transfer does indeed 
involve a loss and acquisition of rights simply depends upon the level of abstraction 
at which it is viewed. If T holds £20 in her account prior to the transfer, we can 
either say that the effect of the transfer upon her account is: (i) to decrease the value 
of her (pre-existing) right to £10, or; (ii) to replace her right with a new one, worth 
£10. Either is plausible. 
                                                      
11 See e.g. Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321; Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch 
159; Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195; [2013] Ch 91; BCCI v Akindele 
[2001] Ch 437; [2000] 3 WLR 1423; Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360. 
12 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson [7-32]. 
13 Relfo v Varsani [35] (Ardern LJ). 
14 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson [7-33]: “there remain difficulties in characterising the chain of 
intervening transactions as a series of “exchanges of assets”. 
15 Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Limited [2004] NSWCA 82. 
16 Ibid. This passage was cited in Hillig v Darkinjung [2006] NSWSC 1217 [20] 
17 E.g. B McFarlane, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property Rights, and Indirect Recipients’ ’ [2009] RLR 37; D. 
Fox, Property Rights in Money (OUP 2008). 
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Yet, even if we accept the second reading – accept, for present purposes, that 
a bank transfer involves a loss and acquisition of rights – obstacles remain for the 
use of exchange product tracing to connect parties to a bank transfer. In particular, 
the alleged product of the rights substitution in any bank transfer is the credit to the 
transferee’s account; it is on this basis that we connect claimant (B) and defendant 
(X). Yet, we saw above that exchange product tracing demands a substitution 
effected by a single actor: the trustee, who was accountable for R, is made 
accountable for the product of R in her hands.  
We can locate precisely such a substitution on the facts of Example 2, but it 
will not help us to substantiate a connection between B and X. Suppose that T in 
Example 2 held £20 in the trust account prior to transfer, and that X held £10 in 
his account prior to transfer. The effect of the transfer then is as follows: T gives 
up one right to £20, and acquires another to £10; X gives up one right to £10 and 
acquires another to £20. Thus, the facts of Example 2 reveal not one but two 
substitutions.18 We still have no way of traversing the gap between B, from whose 
trust account £10 was misdirected, and X, into whose account it was paid.  
Thus, if exchange product tracing is to encompass simple bank transfers, we 
need an explanation for switching our attention at the evidential stage from the 
immediate product of T’s exchange in T’s hands (T’s claim to £10) to what X got 
in return for T’s exchange (X’s claim to £20).19 And, at the relational stage, any such 
explanation must account for the difference between: (i) transmitting a claim to the 
product of a right for which the present right-holder was accountable to B; and (ii) 
transmitting a claim to the product of a right for which someone other than the 
present right-holder was accountable to B. 
Smith recognises this explanatory gap, and seeks to fill it by varying the facts 
of an example akin to Example 1: 
 
Example 1.2: T, trustee, holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T 
buys with it a bottle of wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle 
of wine to X.  
 
According to Smith, if – having received a right to which B has a prior claim – 
X is liable in Example 2, X ought also to be liable in a case like the following 
Example 1.3, in which T simply omits the intermediate step: 
 
                                                      
18 This is reflected in the awkwardness of Ardern LJ’s remarks that what matters is that there has been an 
exchange of the value of the claimant's property into the next product for which it is substituted and so 
on down the chain of substitutions Relfo v Varsani [60]. See further Cutts, ‘Modern Money Had and 
Received’, Forthcoming OJLS. 
19 If it is on account of T’s intention to vest the product in X (as I have argued elsewhere, and which 
explanation the editors of Goff and Jones adopt (Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson [7-33]), we still need to 
explain why this intention should permit B’s claim to have any impact on X.  
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Example 1.3: T, trustee, holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T 
buys with it a bottle of wine, without B’s authority, directing the vendor 
to give the bottle of wine to X. 
 
And this, Smith argues, is precisely how we should think of Example 2, in 
which X acquires the right for which T paid: “The only thing that differentiates this 
kind of substitution is that [T] did not himself acquire possession of his purchase”.20 
Smith calls this “tracing in transit”.21 
This property analogy proceeds in three steps. First, it draws upon the logic of 
the central case: T is liable for the substitute because T was liable for the original. 
Second, it adds a new reason why X would be liable, given a straightforward 
variation of the facts: if X received a right to which B had a prior claim, X would 
have been accountable for that right (absent any defence). Thus (and this is the final 
step), X should be liable where T omits the intermediate property transfer, and 
causes X to be in immediate receipt of the right. 
However compelling Smith’s argument may be for Example 1.3, his logic has 
no force on the facts of Example 2. A bank transfer does not involve the transfer 
of any right, so that the Example 1.2 counterfactual is impossible. Thus, the second 
step – the argument that short-circuiting Example 1.2 by omitting a transfer of 
possession should not alter our conclusion as to X’s liability – is a straightforward 
non sequitur. If there is a reason why Example 2 and Example 1.3 are normatively 
akin, we have not yet found it.   
Yet, I think that Smith’s reasoning does provide an important insight into the 
method by which we have come to incorporate bank transfer cases en masse into our 
law of tracing. In what follows I seek to demonstrate that the process that we have 
called “tracing money” through a bank account does not involve exchange product 
tracing. Instead, it involves two steps: (i) converting bank money, by artifice, into an 
asset that is segregable from the account itself; (ii) following and locating that asset. 
Together, I call these steps “dummy asset tracing”.  
 
 
III.DUMMY ASSET TRACING 
 
DUMMY ASSET TRACING IN EQUITY 
 
Let us return to Example 2:  
 
Example 2: T, a trustee, holds an account on trust for B. T transfers 
£10 from the trust account to that of a third party, X, without B’s 
authority.  
                                                      
20 Smith 248. 
21 Ibid. The editors of Goff and Jones have called this explanation “elegant”: Mitchell, Mitchell and 
Watterson [7-33]. 
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We saw above that exchange product tracing cannot readily encompass the 
connection between the right that X acquires and that which T gives up. In what 
follows, I show that this connection has been forged by interposing a notional 
money asset, which B follows throughout the steps of transfer from T to X, and 
which grounds B’s claim to X’s right. I call this “dummy asset tracing”.  
 
Dummy asset tracing in Equity 
In Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees,22 some £52m was misappropriated 
from various occupational pension schemes by their corporate trustees, GP Noble 
Trustees Ltd and BDC Trustees Ltd. Mr Anthony Morris received £4.89m of those 
funds, of which he paid £1.48m to his former wife, Mrs Morris, to satisfy his liability 
under a consent order. The trustee of the pension schemes, Independent Trustee 
Services Ltd (“ITS”), commenced proceedings to recover the trust assets. It was 
accepted that Mrs Morris could have raised the defence of bona fide purchase at the 
time of receipt; she had given value in the form of agreeing not to pursue any further 
claims for ancillary relief. However, she later succeeded in having the consent order 
set aside, on the basis that Mr Morris’ disclosure in the ancillary relief proceedings 
had been deliberately and materially deficient, and obtained a new order for financial 
provision. By then, she had notice of the trust provenance of the monies. ITS sought 
to recover the £1.48m on the basis that setting aside the consent order negated the 
effect of the defence, thereby reviving the trust. The Court of Appeal agreed: though 
Mrs Morris had clearly obtained “legal title to the money” paid to her; the 
beneficiaries nevertheless could “trace the £1·481m into the hands of Mrs Morris 
on the basis of a subsisting beneficial interest”.23  
In Credit Agricole Corporation and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou,24 the court 
considered an action for the recovery of some US$10.3 million, constituting the 
proceeds of sale of a collection of art deco furniture which had been deposited in a 
bank in Gibraltar. It was common ground that the defendant bank still had, and that 
the claimant could trace, the proceeds of sale; the only question was whether the 
bank could show that it was a bona fide purchaser. Delivering judgment for the 
Privy Council, Lord Clarke held that it was not: the bank ought to have made 
inquiries that would have revealed the claimant’s pre-existing proprietary right to 
the funds received; thus, the claimant could recover the money on the basis of that 
right. Lord Sumption added that it was important to address the question of 
knowledge from the starting point that “We are in the realm of property rights”.25  
Viewed through the lens of exchange product tracing, the courts’ treatment of 
these claims looks odd. If it is the product of (but different from) the right 
                                                      
22 Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees. 
23 Ibid [67]. 
24 Credit Agricole Corp and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou [2015] UKPC 13. 
25 Ibid [4282]. 
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substituted, the defendant’s right cannot be the object of a “subsisting beneficial 
interest”.26 Yet, we have already seen that bank transfers do not readily map on to 
the conceptual framework of exchange product tracing, and it does not seem that 
this is what the courts in ITS and Papadimitriou had in mind: neither mentioned an 
“exchange” or “substitution” of rights; each simply identified the object of the 
tracing exercise, and of the beneficiaries’ “continuing beneficial interest” as “the 
money in [the defendant’s] possession”.27 We are encouraged to assume – indeed, 
it was common ground in both cases –  that the money paid and received remained, 
for all relevant purposes, the same money throughout.  
It is trite that a bank transfer from T to X transfers no thing or right from T to 
X – nothing, indeed, but a “stream of electrons”,28 through which T’s account is 
debited and X’s credited.29 The object of the tracing exercise in these cases – “the 
money paid” by T to X – is not a thing or right actually transferred, but a notional 
money asset. In order to support B’s claim to bank money misdirected from the 
trust fund to the account of X, a third party, the court permits B to convert the sum 
paid and received into a chose in action that exists as an asset independent of the 
underlying accounts. I have called this process “dummy asset tracing”. And 
understood as the product of a notional asset transfer, the claim from persistence is 
logically consistent with the fact of a bank payment from T to X: if X receives a 
notional asset to which B has some pre-existing claim, we need offer no explanation 
for X’s liability beyond the mere fact of receipt (absent any defence).30 
 
Mixed funds 
This ability of equity, to treat money paid and received as an asset independent of 
the underlying account, underpins its approach to more complex cases, involving 
so-called “mixed funds”. A “mixed fund” is created where the value of the account 
into which the claimant seeks to trace is attributable to multiple sources. Take the 
following Example 3: 
 
Example 3: T, trustee, holds a trust account on trust for B, in which 
stands £20. T transfers £10 from that account into T’s current account, 
in which stands £10. 
 
Without dummy asset tracing, the fact of a bank transfer simpliciter (with or 
without the addition of subsequent payments in or drawings out) does not create 
any “evidential gap”. We know exactly what happens when T makes the payment 
to X: the trust account is replaced with a right worth £10 and T acquires a right 
                                                      
26 Birks and Smith have each made this point vociferously, thereby dismissing the ‘fiction of persistence’ in 
tracing: P. Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing ’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 231; Smith. 
27 Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble Trustees [44]; Credit Agricole Corp and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou 
[2]. 
28 Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch 265; [1989] 3 WLR 1367. 
29 R v Preddy [1996] AC 815. 
30 None of this lends support to this function of dummy asset tracing: I turn to the justifications below. It 
is simply to point out that there is no contradiction between tracing and persisting equitable rights. 
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worth £20, which process we can repeat for any subsequent drawings out. However, 
the same set of facts is reinterpreted by Equity, which treats the current account as 
a conglomerate mass of identical claims – a “confusion of funds”.31 or “incorporeal 
mixture”.32 And understood thus, any dealing with a mixed fund does indeed create 
an evidential gap: 
 
When money has been paid into an account (or, for that matter, into a 
bucket, if money were often so kept) and there are subsequent 
drawings out, it is usually not possible to show by evidence exactly 
when those particular units of value were withdrawn.33 
 
Thus, “either the tracing exercise must be regarded as generally foiled by payment 
into a bank account or it must be supported by artificial presumptions”.34  
These presumptions, or “impasse-breaking rules”, are borrowed from cases 
that involve physical mixtures.35 The starting point is the allocation of a claim that 
is equal to, and abates rateably in proportion to, the value of the respective 
contributions;36 this rule applies “whenever the mixture consists of fungibles, 
whether these be physical assets like oil, grain or wine or intangibles like money in 
an account”.37 
That starting point is supplanted by another wherever the mixing is the product 
of a wrongful action on the part of one of the contributors. In these cases, any loss 
is borne by the wrongdoer in the first instance.38 In Re Hallett’s Estate,39 Lord Jessell 
MR explained this consequence with the following analogy: 
 
The simplest case put is the mingling of trust moneys in a bag with 
money of the trustee’s own. Suppose he has a hundred sovereigns in a 
bag, and he adds to them another hundred sovereigns of his own, so 
that they are commingled in such a way that they cannot be 
distinguished, and the next day he draws out for his own purposes 
£100, is it tolerable for anybody to allege that what he drew out was 
the first £100, the trust money, and that he misappropriated it, and left 
                                                      
31 J Ames, ‘Folllowing Misappropriated Property into its Product’ (1906) 19 Harv L Rev 511, 520. 
32 Birks, ‘Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming’ 4. 
33 Ibid. 
34 P Birks, ‘The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing’ in R Cranston (ed), Making Commercial Law: Essays 
in Honour of Roy Goode (OUP 1997) 254. 
35 In Smith’s words: [W]hen there is a mixed substitution, one person’s value is indistinguishably mixed 
with another’s in the new asset. Tracing in this situation is therefore best conducted by analogy to the 
established rules for following through physical mixtures of indistinguishable things. 
36 ‘A mixed fund, like a physical mixture, is divisible between the parties who contributed to it rateably in 
proportion to the value of their respective contributions’ Foskett v McKeown 141 (Lord Millett). 
37 Ibid 141. 
38 For physical mixtures see Indian Oil Corp Ltd v Greenstone Shipping Co SA (Panama) (The Ypatianna) [1988] 
QB 345; [1987] 3 WLR 869. 
39 Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
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his own £100 in the bag? It is obvious he must have taken away that 
which he had a right to take away, his own £100.40 
 
The result must, he thought, be precisely the same for bank accounts: “His money 
was there, and he had a right to draw it out, and why should the natural act of simply 
drawing out the money be attributed to anything except to his ownership of money 
which was at his bankers”.41 
In Re Oatway,42 this rule was developed to allow the beneficiary to attribute her 
portion of the mixed fund to any purchase that returned a profit for the trustee, 
thus producing the conclusion that the beneficiary is able to “cherry-pick”: she can 
either say that “her funds” are still sitting in the account, or she can say that “her 
funds” were used to acquire the new right.  
So, the basic rule is one of proportionate allocation, and depletion, of claims; 
that rule is displaced by one that prejudices the wrongdoer in the event of any 
further dealings with the mixed fund.43  Amongst others, these rules are known as 
the “rules of tracing”. Thus, the rules of tracing are an antidote to the evidential gap 
created by tracing dummy assets in equity, by which equity treats bank money paid 
and received as an intangible segregable from the customer’s claim against her bank.      
 
DUMMY ASSET TRACING AT COMMON LAW 
 
It is generally understood that there is a parallel, though perhaps more limited, 
process of tracing at common law. “Tracing into a substitute is possible”, we are 
told, “provided that there has been a ‘clean substitution’”,44 which is to say: the 
claimant can trace at law from one right into its substitute so long as there is no 
mixture of the kind considered immediately above.  
Yet, much of the work performed by so-called “common law tracing” should 
be a puzzle to those who analyse bank transfers through the prism of exchange 
product tracing. We saw above that exchange product tracing is the process of 
demonstrating that one right (R2) is the product of another (R), in order to transmit 
a claim from R to R2. We also saw how his works in a typical trusts case: T, who 
was previously accountable to B for R as trustee, is now accountable to B for R2. It 
is much more difficult to see how this works at common law. Take the following 
Example 4: 
 
Example 4: A steals B’s bicycle, selling it for £10. 
 
                                                      
40 Ibid 727. 
41 Ibid 727. 
42 Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356. 
43 ‘where a wrongdoer creates an evidential difficulty, that difficulty will be resolved against his interest, 
save so far as he can himself discharge the onus of proving the contrary’ Birks 255. 
44 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP) 123. 
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Common law tracing is thought to provide a mechanism for linking B’s title to 
the bicycle with A’s title to the £10: the substitution is “clean” in the requisite 
sense.45 But it is difficult to see how: the right that A acquires and which she 
exchanges is A’s title; B’s remains with B. And at the relational stage, a transmission 
of legal title must, if it is to be effective at all, oust that of A. The latter problem is 
made only more acute by the fact of a bank transfer: 
 
Example 5: A fraudulently diverts £10 from B’s account to A’s 
account. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
The assertion that B is able, by tracing at common law, to transmit a claim at 
law to the asset in C’s hands is an assertion that B can usurp, unilaterally and without 
notifying the bank, the position of creditor.46 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that common law tracing is not, and never 
has been, a form of exchange product tracing. Those cases which establish a distinct 
version of tracing at “common law tracing” involve bank money paid and received, 
and in these cases – as in equity – the courts have interposed a notional asset, which 
is followed from one person to another through the steps of a bank transfer. I will 
show that the difference between dummy asset tracing in equity and at law goes to 
the nature of the asset interposed: in equity, the asset is a right; at law, the asset is a 
physical thing.  
 
Developing common law tracing  
Though most of our tracing cases involve (for reasons that I discuss in what follows) 
equitable tracing, the best-known instance of exchange product tracing is not a 
Chancery case; rather it is a case heard in a common law court three decades prior 
to procedural fusion. In Taylor v Plumer,47 Plumer had given his stockbroker, Walsh, 
a draft for £22,500 to buy Exchequer bills. Instead of doing this, Walsh exchanged 
the draft for Bank of England notes, with which he paid US government stock and 
Portuguese gold coins. Walsh attempted to abscond to the United States, but was 
apprehended by Plumer’s agent, who took the stock and gold from him. Walsh’s 
assignees in bankruptcy brought an action against Plumer in trover, arguing that 
Walsh’s act of fleeing London was an act of bankruptcy, so that the assignees had, 
at that point, acquired legal title.  
Departing from a long line of cases that had placed the agent’s authority to act 
at the heart of the justification for a proprietary claim to the exchange product of a 
right held on trust, Lord Ellenborough concluded that: 
 
                                                      
45 Burrows: “Examples of clean substitutions are the exchange of a car for a boat; or a cow for a goat; or 
£1000 in cash for a picture”. 
46 I consider this below, in the text accompanying fn 70-71. 
47 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721. 
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If the property in its original state and form was covered with a trust 
in favour of the principal, no change of that state and form can divest 
it of such trust… for the product of or substitute for the original thing 
still follows the nature of the thing itself, as long as it can be ascertained 
to be such, and the right only ceases when the means of ascertainment 
fail, which is the case when the subject is turned into money, and mixed 
and confounded in a general mass of the same description.48 
 
It is now well documented that the success of the claim at common law in fact 
depended wholly upon the conclusion that Walsh held the bills on trust,49 and was 
a simple product of the desire to prevent a clash of jurisprudence between Chancery 
and the common law courts.50 The notion that there is a distinct process of tracing 
“at common law” stems from the interpretation and incorporation of the final 
clause of that passage, by which Lord Ellenborough reclothed the words of Willes 
J in Scott v Surman.51 This has cemented the idea that when a claimant cannot point 
to a fiduciary relationship at the start of the story, she must trace and claim “at 
common law”, which exercise is thwarted whenever it is confronted by a “mixed 
fund”.52  
I shall return to mixtures below. The object of present attention, to which I 
turn in what follows, is the notion that there is a common law variant of exchange 
product tracing, which underpins the potential for a claimant to transmit her claim 
from one right to its traceable proceeds.  
 
Modern common law tracing 
Despite the equitable foundation for common law tracing, it is now well established 
that there is a distinct process of tracing at common law.53 In what follows, I 
consider three cases that have been particularly influential in shaping that process. 
In each, the court held that the claimant could trace at law in order to establish title 
to money debited from the claimant’s account by a third party and paid to the 
defendant. 
In Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck,54 an employee had forged his 
employer’s signature, thereby procuring a transfer of some £6000 from his 
employer’s account to his own account at Farrow’s bank. Hambrouck then drew 
cheques on this account, giving them to his mistress, Mlle Spanoghe, who credited 
her account with corresponding sums. The Court of Appeal held that Banque Belge 
could recover £315 then standing in Mlle Spanoghe’s account as “their property”:55 
Taylor v Plumer permitted “money though changed in character to be recovered, if it 
                                                      
48 Ibid 726 
49 S Khurshid and P Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78; Smith. 
50 Cutts. 
51 Scott v Surman (1742) Willes 400. 
52 Agip v Jackson. 
53 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones 169 (Millett J). 
54 Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck. 
55 Ibid 333. 
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can be traced”,56 and as she had given no valuable consideration, Mlle Spanoghe 
could not “set up a title derived from Hambrouck, who had no title against the true 
owner”.57 Thus, title either remained with the bank throughout,58 or it had revested 
when the bank expressed a desire to disavow the transaction.59 
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale,60 Cass, one of the partners of a firm of solicitors, 
obtained funds from a client account by withdrawing cash by cheque, and by causing 
funds to be transferred to building society accounts in his name, from which he 
withdrew cash. He used that cash to gamble in the defendant casino. Lord Goff 
considered that the solicitors could “trace their property at common law” in the 
bank account “into its product, i.e. cash drawn by Cass from their client account at 
the bank”.61 The court ordered the casino to pay the firm a sum equivalent to that 
which it had received from Cass, reduced by any sums that it had released as 
winnings.  
In Trustee of FC Jones v Jones,62 Mr Jones had drawn cheques in his wife’s favour 
on his insolvent firm. She used the funds thereby credited to her account to 
speculate successfully in potato futures. The trustee in bankruptcy was held to be 
entitled to “trace his money at Midland Bank into the money in the defendant’s 
account with the commodity brokers”,63 and to claim the proceeds of her 
investments as its property. Lord Millett called this claim “exclusively proprietary”,64 
concluding that, “as from the date of the act of bankruptcy the money in the 
bankrupts’ joint account at Midland Bank belonged to the trustee”.65 Again, the 
court held that the claimant retained title throughout, so that the money asset 
received by Mrs Jones was never hers; she was “in possession of funds to which she 
had no title”.66 
In each of these cases, the liability of the defendant depended upon the 
claimant’s ability to show a title to the intermediate money asset in the wrongdoer’s 
hands; in each, the court held that it was possible for the claimant to establish such 
a title, and that this claim was a claim at common law. This claim has proven 
exceedingly difficult to explain.67 In Lipkin Gorman, Lord Goff was not prepared to 
depart from a line of cases that established that the cash withdrawn from the client 
account, and that which was transferred from the account into Cass’s building 
                                                      
56 Ibid 330. 
57 ibid. 
58 Ibid 327 (Bankes LJ). 
59 Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v Hambrouck 322 (Atkin LJ). 
60 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548. 
61 Ibid 574. 
62 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones. 
63 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones [1997] Ch 159, 170. 
64 ibid 168. 
65 ibid 166. This nominally produced the absurd result that the trustee in bankruptcy was creditor, and in 
practice permitted the claimant to recover the original sum and profits, all of which had been paid into 
court. 
66 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones167. 
67 In L Smith, ‘Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds’ (2009) 125 LQR 338 Smith says that “There are 
as many theories of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd as there are writers on the subject”. 
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society account, belonged to Cass.68 Nevertheless, he held that the cash was “[the 
solicitors’] property at common law”.69 This apparent contradiction is exacerbated 
by the nature of the asset claimed in both Hambrouck and Trustee of FC Jones. If the 
claimant, by tracing, acquires an immediate claim at common law to the relevant 
account, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that she thereby usurps the position 
of creditor.70 This obviates the rules that prohibit secret assignment, and make it 
impossible for the debtor to know from whom she can obtain a good receipt.  As 
Birks puts it: 
 
Suppose Mrs Jones had taken her £50,000 from the brokers and 
disappeared with it. On such facts some agile footwork would have 
been necessary in order to explain exactly why the brokers should not 
be liable to pay the same sum over again, to the trustee, as being the 
only person who could give them a good receipt.71 
 
In the next section, I explain that a great deal of this confusion has been caused by 
aggregating two different types of case. The first, which reflects the fact pattern of 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale, and which I considered above, is as follows: 
 
Example 1.2: T, trustee, holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T 
buys with it a bottle of wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle 
of wine to X.  
 
I argue (like others)72 that Example 1.2 involves the common law recognition 
of a claim in equity, to the object of a trust.  
The second type of case, which reflects the fact pattern of Banque Belge v 
Hambrouck and (less closely) Trustee of FC Jones v Jones, is as follows: 
 
Example 5: A fraudulently diverts £10 from B’s account to A’s 
account. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
I argue (unlike others)73 that Example 5 involves the pursuit of a notional asset 
from B to C, which I have called “dummy asset tracing”. 
 
Exchange product tracing at common law 
The prevailing view of the common law tracing cases that I have considered so far 
is that they are mislabelled: in each, the claimants did not acquire a direct claim to 
                                                      
68 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 573. 
69 Ibid 574. 
70 Fox. 
71 Birks, ‘Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming’ 7. 
72 See e.g. Smith; McFarlane.  
73 For each of Smith and McFarlane, these cases also fall to be analysed as trusts.  
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the cash or against the bank; rather they acquired a claim to the defendant’s right – 
or, in other words, a trust.74  
It is relatively easy to reconcile this analysis with the way in which Lord Goff 
conceptualised the claim in Lipkin Gorman. Lord Goff noted that, “even if legal title 
to the money did vest in Cass immediately on receipt, nevertheless he would have 
held it on trust for his partners, who would accordingly have been entitled to trace 
it in equity”;75 yet, he emphasised that “your Lordships are not concerned with an 
equitable tracing claim in the present case, since no such case is advanced by the 
solicitors, who have been content to proceed at common law”.76 We have seen that 
this is precisely the proposition for which Taylor v Plumer stood at the time of its 
decision, which is that the common law would recognise a personal claim on facts 
that would have given rise to a trust in equity.  
If we adopt this explanation of Lipkin Gorman, the only difference between that 
case and Taylor v Plumer is that in the former the trust asset was in the hands of a 
third party at the time of the claim. Thus, the facts are analogous to our Example 
1.2: 
 
Example 1.2: T, trustee, holds title to a £10 note on trust for B. T 
buys with it a bottle of wine, without B’s authority. T gives the bottle 
of wine to X.  
 
No explanation beyond the mere fact of receipt is necessary to account for the 
firm’s claim against the casino: the claim that arose upon Cass’s substitution persists 
through the cash transfer to the casino, grounding a claim to the money in its hands.  
Yet, though it is possible to construct a strong case – both as a matter of 
authority and principle – for an equitable account of Lipkin Gorman, that account 
depends upon three features that make it an uneasy panacea for all of our common 
law tracing cases. The first is that there must be grounds for the conclusion that the 
intermediate party is a trustee of the right acquired. The facts of Trustee of FC Jones 
can be reconciled with that conclusion (though the court did not treat the claim in 
this way): Mr Jones, as a partner to the firm from which he misdirected funds, might 
well have been accountable as a matter of primary right for the cheque that he gave 
to Mrs Jones.77 But it is much more difficult to find similar grounds for the 
conclusion that Hambrouck was a trustee of the account from which he paid Mrs 
Jones.78  
                                                      
74 See e.g. Smith 346; McFarlane. 
75 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 572. 
76 Ibid 572. 
77 See 29(1) Partnership Act 1890 and Don King Productions Inc v Warren Don King Productions Inc v 
Warren [1998] 2 All ER 608; Barber v Rasco International Ltd [2012] EWHC 269. 
78 We might be able to reach the conclusion that Hambrouck was a trustee of the cheque, by reference to 
the mechanics of rescission, but it is ordinarily thought that rescission revests title; the account was not an 
asset with which the bank began. 
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Secondly, the equitable account of Lipkin Gorman requires that the third party 
receive the object of the trust. If this is possible in Trustee of FC Jones, it is not in 
Hambrouck: the right received by Mlle Spanoghe – title to the cheque and then the 
right against her bank – was a new right, different from title to the cheque through 
which Hambrouck debited Pelabon’s account or Hambrouck’s right against his 
bank.  
Third, the right claimed must be the trust right. And here, neither case fits the 
trusts analysis: in Trustee of FC Jones, as in Hambrouck, the right claimed was not the 
cheque that moved from wrongdoer to third party, but the account into which the 
funds were paid. If there is a reason for reconceptualising these cases on the basis 
of equitable principles, and treating the steps of payment as a single property 
transfer, so as to warrant the analogy between Example 1.2 and Hambrouck and FC 
Jones, we have not yet found it.   
 
Dummy asset tracing at common law 
Example 5 is intended to serve as a proxy for the facts of Hambrouck and FC Jones: 
 
Example 5: A fraudulently diverts £10 from B’s account to A’s 
account. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
I argue here that these cases establish a process of “common law tracing” that 
exists independently of its counterpart in equity, and that this process is a form of 
dummy asset tracing, in which the notional asset interposed is a physical cash asset. 
In Agip v Jackson,79 a payment order had been fraudulently altered to name 
Baker Oil as beneficiary. That order was executed by the claimant’s bank, Banque 
du Sud, which debited their account with $518,822.92, and instructed Baker Oil’s 
bank (Lloyds Bank) to credit Baker Oil’s account in London with the same sum, 
giving instructions to its correspondent bank in New York to reimburse Lloyds 
Bank. Lloyds Bank acted on those instructions. At the third defendant’s behest, it 
then transferred the sum to the account of the defendants’ firm with the bank. 
The putative problem with tracing at common law tracing lay in the existence 
of clearing, which the court treated as a form of “mixed fund”.80 We saw above that 
equity treats money paid and received as a right that retains its integrity as it moves 
through the steps of transfer, and which survives admixture. Thus, there was “no 
difficulty in tracing the plaintiffs’ property in equity, which can follow the money as 
it passed through the accounts of the correspondent banks in New York or, more 
realistically, follow the chose in action through its transmutation”.81 Millett J was 
                                                      
79 Agip v Jackson. 
80 Ibid 289. 
81 Ibid 289. 
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clear, however, that tracing at common law has never benefited from the same 
flexibility. Echoing the words of Lord Greene in Re Diplock, 82 Millett J said: 
 
The common law has always been able to follow a physical asset from 
one recipient to another. Its ability to follow an asset in the same hands 
into a changed form was established in Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562. 
In following the plaintiff's money into an asset purchased exclusively 
with it, no distinction is drawn between a chose in action such as the 
debt of a bank to its customer and any other asset: In re Diplock [1948] 
Ch. 466, 519. But it can only follow a physical asset, such as a cheque 
or its proceeds, from one person to another. It can follow money but 
not a chose in action. Money can be followed at common law into and 
out of a bank account and into the hands of a subsequent transferee, 
provided that it does not cease to be identifiable by being mixed with 
other money in the bank account derived from some other source.83 
 
There are four steps to this analysis, which has been taken as the starting point for 
many accounts of the distinction between common law and equitable tracing: (i) 
there are two kinds of tracing – tracing from one asset to another in the same set of 
hands, and tracing from one person to another; (ii) in the latter capacity, common 
law tracing always demands a physical object; (iii) the common law will treat money 
in an account as such a physical asset, but (iv) it will not do so if there is a “mixed 
fund”, which is either an account the value of which is attributable to multiple 
sources, or some element of clearing. Thus, like equity, the common law is able to 
turn a bank transfer from one person to another into the transfer of a notional asset; 
unlike equity, the form of that notional asset is a physical cash asset. This difference 
lies at heart of the common law’s inferior capacity to deal with mixed funds: a 
process that treats money in a “strictly materialistic way” cannot cope with a 
confusion of fungible claims.84 
This makes a great deal more sense of the decisions in Banque Belge v Hambrouck 
and Trustee of FC Jones v Jones: by treating each bank payment as if it transferred a 
cash asset to the defendant, the court could at once recognise that the payee was 
creditor and hold that the transfer vested in the claimant a title that could ground a 
claim to get it back from the eventual recipient. And it provides an explanation for 
why Lord Millett saw nothing wrong with the conclusion that the trustee’s claim in 
FC Jones was both a claim at law, and a property claim: the subject matter of that 
claim was not the bank debt – which could only have been owing to Mrs Jones, and 
which could not have been “owned” at all – but the notional money asset that it 
                                                      
82 Re Diplock [1951] AC 251 520. “The common law approached [tracing] in a strictly materialistic way. It 
could only appreciate what might almost be called the "physical" identity of one thing with another. It 
could treat a person's money as identifiable so long as it had not become mixed with other money”. 
83 Agip v Jackson 285. 
84 Re Diplock 520. 
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represented. Thus, Mrs Jones was “in possession of funds to which she had no 
title”.85 
So, there is a distinct process of “common law tracing”, which cannot be 
subsumed within the hybrid analysis of Taylor v Plumer: a claimant may connect a 
sum wrongfully debited from her account with another credited to that of the 
defendant by treating the money paid and received as a physical cash asset 
independent of the underlying account. 
 
A single set of rules? 
There have been many academic and judicial calls to bring common law tracing in 
line with the equitable approach.86 Birks put this most colourfully:  
 
An exercise of identification either can or cannot be conducted. It 
would be absurd to suppose that it could be conducted vigorously and 
resourcefully only on Mondays and Thursday, and it is prima facie no 
less absurd to assert that it can be so conducted only by a plaintiff who 
has managed to attract the attention of equity.87 
 
Indeed, there is no small inconsistency between the conclusions that: (i) Equity 
permits a claimant to pursue a notional intangible asset into a mixture, by analogy 
with common law rules for mixtures of physical things, but (ii) that these rules are 
inapplicable to common law tracing, by which a claimant pursues a notional physical 
asset.88 For so long as we remain committed to the precepts of dummy asset tracing, 
there are strong arguments for conducting that process in the same way, regardless 
of whether the claim is a claim at common law, or an equitable claim that follows 
from a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
 
IV.DUMMY ASSET TRACING AND CLAIMING 
 
In what follows, I consider the role that dummy asset tracing has played in shaping 
third party liability for bank money misapplied. I deal first with cases that involve 
equitable liability in “knowing receipt”, and second with third party liability at 
common law. I show that dummy asset tracing has encouraged the view that it is 
possible for a claimant to assert a continuing (legal or equitable) title to a money 
asset received by the defendant. This section is descriptive; I consider the 
justification for dummy asset tracing in the section that follows.   
 
EQUITABLE PROPERTY AND KNOWING RECEIPT  
 
                                                      
85 Trustee of FC Jones v Jones 167. 
86 Millett LJ in FC Jones ibid 169. Foskett v McKeown 113 (Lord Steyn), 129 (Lord Millett). Smith 120-130. 
87 Birks 243.  
88 Fox [7.28]. 
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We saw above that the beneficiaries in ITS v GP Noble trustees were permitted to 
pursue, and assert a “continuing beneficial interest” in, the funds that Mrs Morris 
acquired from Mr Morris. So, in the following Example 2, and just as if T had 
transferred a physical asset, B can rely upon her original title to set up a claim against 
X: 
 
Example 2: T, a trustee, holds an account on trust for B. T transfers £10 from 
the trust account to that of a third party, X, without B’s authority.  
 
Personal liability for the receipt of a trust right is governed by an extension of 
this logic: B retains title to the trust property; if X knows about T’s breach, X is 
personally liable for the money that she acquires from T “as if” she were a trustee 
of it.89 Yet, the precise mechanics of that liability have been the subject of some 
debate, which can be divided usefully into three schools of thought.  
The first view of knowing receipt grounds liability in the property rights of B, 
rather than in any wrong to which X might be situated as an accessory. In Arthur v 
Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands,90 the Privy Council accepted that 
“knowing receipt claims, even though for personal relief, are properly viewed as a 
vindication of pre-existing property rights and are parasitic on those property 
rights”.91 For Davies, too, “liability in knowing receipt is not participatory at all. 
Simply receiving misapplied property is inherently passive… the source of a receipt-
based claim lies in the realm of property”.92 Elsewhere, it has been described as a 
form of “adverse possession”,93 though this seems liable to confuse.94 The best 
understanding of this account is that the primary wrong is an equitable version of 
the common law tort of conversion (though liability is not strict) in which B sues 
for X’s interference with the trust right. Let us call this the “property interference” 
account. 
The second school of thought is that, by receiving the trust right with 
knowledge, X actually becomes a trustee. Let us call this the “true trustee account”: 
 
                                                      
89 I borrow this language from Paragon Finance v DB Thakerar [1999] 1 All ER 400 408, though we will see 
that not everyone ascribes to the similic view of liability. For now, I will deal only with cases in which there 
is some primary trust; I deal below with cases in which the agent acts without authority. Lord Hoffmann: 
For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, 
the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the 
plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
90 Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30. 
91 Ibid [38] (Sir Terence Etherton). 
92 P Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart 2015) See also D Sheehan, ‘Disentangling Equitable Personal 
Remedies for Receipt and Assistance’ (2008) 16 RLR 41: “knowing receipt, however, is a different type of 
wrong from dishonest assistance. It appears to be a hybrid, possibly unique in being parasitic, but non-
participatory in any sense”. 
93 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] AC 1189 [13] (Lord Sumption). 
94  Possession cannot be adverse to any beneficiary without an immediate right to possession; it cannot be 
adverse to the possessory claim of a trustee who willingly gives it up. 
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[W]hen the courts say that a knowing recipient is ‘personally liable to 
account as a constructive trustee’, they mean exactly what they say: 
because of the circumstances in which knowing recipients acquire title 
to the misapplied property, Equity fixes them with custodial duties 
which are the same as some of the duties which are voluntarily assumed 
by express trustees.95 
 
Mitchell and Watterson do not anywhere explain why this “fixing” occurs, or 
seek to identify the wrong from which it arises: theirs is an account of the nature of 
liability, not of its justification. Yet, they reject the view that knowing recipients owe 
a form of “participatory” liability, so that the true trustee account can be contrasted 
usefully with the following “accessory account”. 
The final way in which the knowing recipient’s liability has been framed places 
less emphasis upon the beneficiary’s prior property right: receipt is simply one 
method by which a person might implicate themselves in another’s wrongdoing. In 
Paragon Finance v DB Thakerar,96 Millet LJ put it thus: 
 
Equity has always given relief against fraud by making any person 
sufficiently implicated in the fraud accountable in equity…. In such a 
case he is traditionally though I think unfortunately described as a 
constructive trustee and said to be “liable to account as constructive 
trustee.” Such a person is not in fact a trustee at all, even though he 
may be liable to account as if he were.97  
 
This is the “accessory account”: the defendant is liable on account of her 
participation in a primary wrong, to which she is situated as accessory.98  
The question of whether X is a trustee properly so called, or whether her 
liability depends upon a wrong in which she is implicated, arose for consideration 
in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria.99 In that case, the claimant had participated in a 
transaction under which it was alleged that he had been defrauded of some $6.5 
million, which money had been paid into an account maintained by the defendant 
in England. The question was whether, having brought his claim 14 years after it 
accrued, the claimant’s action was time-barred. Section 21(3) of the Limitation Act 
prescribes a six-year period for any “action by a beneficiary to recover trust property 
or in respect of any breach of trust” not otherwise covered by the Act. However, 
                                                      
95 C Mitchell and S Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in C Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart 2010). 
96 Paragon Finance v DB Thakerar. 
97 Ibid 408, citing Ungoed J in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No.3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 1582. 
98 For the argument that both knowing receipt and dishonest assistance belong to the same participatory 
wrong, see Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in W. Cornish and others 
(ed), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart); P. Birks, ‘Receipt’ in P. Birks 
and A. Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart), and Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd [1975] 132 
CLR 373; Fyffes Group Ltd v Templeman [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 643. 
99 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria. 
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section 21(1)(a) of the 1980 Act provides that: “No period of limitation prescribed 
by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action in 
respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party 
or privy”. Thus, one of the arguments advanced for the claimant was that a knowing 
recipient could be regarded as a “trustee” for the purposes of section 21(1)(a).  
A majority of the Supreme Court held that it could not. According to Lord 
Sumption, the reason why the clock does not run in an action against a trustee in 
respect of the misapplication of trust assets is that a trustee’s liability does not 
depend upon proof of any breach. Rather, “if the trustee misapplied the assets, 
equity would ignore the misapplication and simply hold him to account for the 
assets as if he had acted in accordance with his trust”.100 By contrast, strangers to 
the trust who receive trust assets misappropriated in breach of duty are liable “by 
virtue of their participation in the unlawful misapplication of trust assets”.101 
Though it was not necessary to decide the point to dispose of the appeal, Lord 
Sumption appears to have understood knowing receipt as a form of liability that is 
parasitic upon the breach of trust, rather than (like Sir Terence Etherton in Arthur v 
Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands) the beneficiary’s property rights. He 
emphasised that knowing receipt involves a dealing with trust assets that is “adverse 
to the beneficiaries”;102 yet, he described both dishonest assistance and knowing 
receipt as two forms of “ancillary liability”: 
 
Either they have dishonestly assisted in a misapplication of the funds by the 
trustee, or they have received trust assets knowing that the transfer to them 
was a breach of trust. In either case, they may be required by equity to account 
as if they were trustees or fiduciaries, although they are not. These can 
conveniently be called cases of ancillary liability. The intervention of equity 
in such cases does not reflect any pre-existing obligation but comes about 
solely because of the misapplication of the assets.103 
 
So, there are three accounts of liability in knowing receipt: for property interference 
and true trustee accounts, dummy asset tracing goes to show that X received a right 
to which B has a superior claim; for the accessory account (for which there is now 
increased support), dummy asset tracing goes to show that X was implicated in the 
fraud by which B was stripped of the trust asset. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
100 Ibid [13]. 
101 Ibid [13]. 
102 Ibid [13]. 
103 Indeed, he used the labels “dishonest” and “knowing” interchangeably for each type of liability. 
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LEGAL PROPERTY AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
According to Burrows, the decision in Hambrouck exemplifies a “title and tracing” 
exception to the ordinary rule that the claimant who seeks to recover money from 
the defendant in an action for restitution of an unjust enrichment must be the 
“direct provider” of that sum:104 “by means of tracing and title, a claimant can show 
that value in a substitute asset comprises a transfer of value from the claimant: one 
is tracing value as it is transferred from the claimant’s asset to its substitute”.105 Thus, 
in the following Example 5, B can trace through each substitution (B’s right for A’s 
right, A’s right for C’s right), thereby demonstrating that the credit to C’s account 
represents a transfer of value from her: 
 
Example 5: A fraudulently diverts £10 from B’s account to A’s 
account. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
Framed as a process of pursuing value, Taylor v Plumer and Hambrouck appear 
identical: the claimant can either pursue value from one right to another through an 
exchange, or she can pursue value from one person to another through a transfer; 
either way, the claimant can show that the defendant received value that emanated 
from her. I have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake, which conflates two distinct 
kinds of value.106 The first is the susceptibility of a right to exchange (which I have 
called exchange potential); this is the kind of value involved in exchange product 
tracing, and it does not move from one right to another. The second is wealth (value 
measured as a sum of the purchasing power to which an individual has recourse, 
minus her liabilities). This is the kind of value involved in a bank transfer from one 
person to another, and it provides no mechanism for connecting B’s account with 
that of C, with whom B had no dealings, so as to substantiate B’s claim that C should 
reverse A’s wrongful debit. 
Birks offers a different, simpler, account of three-party cases. For Birks, “a 
receipt of your money is always a receipt directly from you”,107 so that if the claimant 
can establish a proprietary claim to the thing or right transferred to the defendant, 
it is irrelevant that she did not effect the transfer herself: 
 
If I find your wallet it makes no difference whether I am the first 
recipient or the second or the twenty-second. Suppose a pickpocket 
took it and, in alarm, threw it down, and then I found it. My position 
would be exactly the same as if your wallet had fallen from your pocket 
into the road in front of me without your noticing its loss.108  
 
                                                      
104 Burrows 119. 
105 Ibid 119. 
106 Cutts (forthcoming, OJLS). 
107 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2004) 87. 
108 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2004) 87. 
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Thus, the “proprietary connection” that justifies the claimant’s claim against a party 
with whom she did not transact directly is not an exception to the direct provider 
rule; it is an application of it. 
Birks applies this account directly to the facts of Hambrouck,109  thereby treating 
the money paid by the bank to Hambrouck, and by Hambrouck to Mlle Spanoghe, 
as transfer akin to that of a physical cash asset. We have already seen that this is  
precisely the approach adopted by the court in that case, which encouraged the 
conclusion that Mlle Spanoghe could not “set up a title derived from Hambrouck, 
who had no title against the true owner”.110  This is what I have called dummy asset 
tracing, and it allows us to conceptualise Example 5 as a simple transfer of money 
that is owned by the claimant at law into the hands of a third party: C receives a 
notional cash asset to which B has a better title.  
There has been some debate about whether cases that involve receipt of the 
claimant’s property are appropriately termed “unjust enrichment” at all.111 I have 
considered this elsewhere,112 and will not dwell on it here, save to say this: to the 
extent that the legal event responsible for the creation of liability is some breach of 
a (real or putative) exclusionary obligation, the alternative clothing in unjust 
enrichment seems at best unnecessary, and at worst confusing.  
However, we have not yet addressed the question that is logically prior to the 
appropriate categorisation of common law claims against third parties for bank 
money misappropriated: I will consider in the penultimate part of this paper whether 
these cases should be governed by the notion of a property transfer at all.   
 
 
V.CRITIQUING DUMMY ASSET TRACING 
 
Birks described dummy asset tracing as a “metaphorical” process.113 Yet, we have 
seen that it is not merely a figure of expression: dummy asset tracing is a legal device, 
the use of which has manifest consequences for third parties. It allows us to forge a 
connection between a claimant from whose account money was wrongfully debited, 
to an innocent third party whose account was credited by the wrongdoer, by virtue 
of the latter’s receipt and possession of a monetary asset that previously belonged 
(at law or in equity) to the claimant. As such, we should make sure that it can be 
defended robustly.  
Whenever it has been necessary to formulate an explanation for dummy asset 
tracing,114 it is usually along the following lines: there would be liability if the facts 
                                                      
109 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (OUP) 86-87. 
110 ibid. Trustee of FC Jones, too, we saw that this guided Millett LJ’s conclusion that Mrs Jones ‘in possession 
of funds to which she had no title’ Trustee of FC Jones v Jones167. 
111 See e.g. W. Swadling, ‘Ignorance and Enrichment: the Problem of Title’ (2008) 28 OJLS 627. 
112 Cutts, ‘Modern Money Had And Received” Forthcoming, OJLS. 
113 Birks, ‘Taking Seriously the Differences Between Tracing and Claiming’ 4. 
114 And I suspect that a substantial part of what instigated dummy asset tracing is a an impulse towards 
framing things by reference to familiar ideas. 
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involved dealings in physical money; thus, liability cannot be escaped by the mere 
fact that the money happens to take an intangible form.115 This can be framed 
institutionally, or at an individual level.  
Proctor, present editor of Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, presents the 
institutional argument instrumentally: “if money is to exist in several different forms, 
then the law should certainly ensure that the rights of a person who receives ‘money’ 
are the same, irrespective of the precise form in which that money is conveyed”.116 
Thus, the law must attribute to bank media “characteristics which will enable it 
effectively to fulfil functions which similar to those performed by notes and 
coins”.117 One such characteristic goes to the circumstances in which money can be 
recovered from payees: though money can, by tracing, be “followed in rem against 
a holder who acted in bad faith or gave no consideration”, it must be generally 
irrecoverable from a good faith payee.118 
This requires some unpacking. By way of contrast with the treatment of other 
tangible assets, cash cannot be recovered from a good faith payee.119 This helps to 
ensure the free currency of money by affording confidence to the holder that they 
will not be deprived of it.120 Yet, for bank payments, that confidence is already 
supplied by the irrevocability of the payment instruction by which credit is 
transferred.121 It is only by treating bank money as property that we first encounter 
the need to limit the circumstances in which it can be recovered; the instrumental 
argument fails to justify treating bank money as property.  
The analogical argument is weaker at the individual level. We have already seen 
that the effect of dummy asset tracing at law is that an individual can be made 
accountable for their putative receipt of a notional asset to which the claimant has 
or had a better claim. Liability is strict, and it replicates the conditions for and 
consequences of property. This ought to be somewhat surprising. That we should 
be chary of extending the ambit of exclusionary duties was the thrust of the decision 
in OBG v Allan,122 that a person who sought to usurp the contractual claim of 
another could not be held liable in conversion. There being no tangible asset, there 
was nothing to form the object of a claim that the defendant owed and had breached 
an obligation to stay away. There are good reasons for this: it is usually far easier for 
someone to recognise and comply with exclusionary obligations in respect of 
tangible objects.  
Yet, there is a strong sense in which the contract in OBG v Allan was a better 
candidate for ownership than bank money paid: if the exclusionary responsibility 
                                                      
115 Re Hallett's Estate. 
116 C. Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (7th edn, OUP) 43. 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid. 
119 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398. 
120 Ibid 459: speaking of banknotes, Lord Mansfield considered it “necessary, for the purposes of 
commerce, that their currency should be established and secured”; thus the defence would be available to 
the recipient of notes, as to the recipient of coins.  
121 The Brimnes [1973] 1 WLR 386; Tayeb v HSBC Bank [2004] EWCH 1529, [2004] 4 All ER 1024. 
122 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1. 
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were to extend only to a true usurpation of contractual rights, it would not often be 
possible to breach it accidentally. By contrast, dummy asset tracing precipitates a 
liability for interfering with the (fictional) property claim of a person who may be 
wholly unknown to the defendant, on the basis of a defective transaction that 
occurred at some point in time prior to the immediate payment. It is extremely easy 
to interfere with such a claim accidentally; indeed, such was the court’s conclusion 
as to Mrs Jones’ position in Trustee of FC Jones v Jones.  
In what follows, I present the case for limiting the circumstances in which a 
third party can be held liable to someone with whom she did not transact. 
 
 
VI.REPLACING DUMMY ASSET TRACING 
 
We are not bound to dummy asset tracing. We have already seen that there is 
support, in and out of the courts, for an approach that locates liability, not in the 
defendant’s putative receipt of some asset belonging (at law or in equity) to the 
claimant, but in her proximity to the relevant injustice.123 In what follows, I make 
the case for extending that approach to all cases that currently fall within the 
territory of dummy asset tracing.  
 
KNOWING RECEIPT: INTERFERING WITH THE TRUST, AND 
DEFECTIVE TRANSACTIONS  
 
Let us return to Example 2: 
 
Example 2: T, a trustee, holds an account on trust for B. T transfers 
£10 from the trust account to that of a third party, X, without B’s 
authority.  
 
Without dummy asset tracing, the claimant cannot pin the defendant’s liability 
on the notional receipt of an asset to which the claimant has a continuing claim; we 
must find some other foundation for liability in so-called “knowing receipt”. In fact 
(though the label seems inapt), we retain material for both sides of the debate 
concerning whether liability in knowing receipt is a primary or participatory wrong: 
either knowing receipt is a type of accessory liability, in which the primary wrong 
takes the particular form of misapplying trust rights; alternatively, knowing receipt 
is a type of primary wrong, akin to conversion at law, but which involves an 
interference with trust rights other than through receiving them. Either way, X is 
                                                      
123 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria. 
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liable because she is situated as a party to a transaction that has the immediate effect 
of disabling T from performing the trust.124  
A more substantial consequence of the departure from dummy asset tracing 
concerns the manner in which we conceptualise cases that do not involve a breach 
of fiduciary duty by a non-trustee. Take the following example: 
 
Example 6: A, director of B Co, pays money from B Co to C without B Co’s 
authority. 
 
The language of tracing has made it possible to avoid detailing the specific 
nature of the wrong in several such cases. Importantly, few of these cases involve 
any primary trust, so that the terminology and logic of “trust property” misdirected 
is inappropriate. 
In BCCI v Akindele,125 the defendant, Akindele, entered into an agreement with 
ICIC Ltd, a company controlled by the BCCI group, to pay $10 million for shares 
in another company in the same group. Under the agreement, the defendant was 
guaranteed a return of 15 per cent if he decided to sell his shares after two years, 
which he did. Payment was made by BCCI Overseas, which was subsequently 
reimbursed by ICIC Ltd. The reason for the arrangement was to boost BCCI’s 
apparent capital. The liquidator sought to hold the defendant liable for knowing 
receipt, arguing that the defendant acquired the funds with “constructive knowledge 
of a misapplication of trust property”.126 Nourse LJ accepted the argument from 
tracing, though he rejected the claim for lack of knowledge. 
Relfo v Varsani concerned a claim brought by the liquidator of Relfo Ltd 
(“Relfo”) against Mr Varsani to recover $878,479.35 that had been misappropriated 
by its former director, Mr Gorecia.127 Mr Gorecia, in breach of fiduciary duty, 
caused Relfo to pay $890,050 to a company called Mirren Ltd (“Mirren”). The next 
day, another company, Intertrade Group LLC (“Intertrade”), paid $878,479.35 to 
Mr Varsani’s bank account. Explaining that “Tracing enables a beneficiary to 
recover trust property that has been misappropriated”,128 Arden LJ held that Varsani 
was liable in knowing receipt. 
Conaglen and Nolan argue that the failure to elucidate the distinction between 
trustees and custodial fiduciaries who are not trustees, but who occupy the position 
of agent, is one of the primary obstacles to understanding liability in knowing 
receipt. They point out that, “despite the superficial similarity between trustees, who 
act “on behalf of the trust”, and true agents, such as company directors, these two 
                                                      
124  There may be one practical difference entailed by the conclusion that the defendant’s liability is not 
based on her receipt of a right to which the beneficiary has a better claim: the subsequent acquisition of 
knowledge ought not to convert the receipt of money into a primary or participatory wrong for 
interference with the trust Baden v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de l'Industrie en 
France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509, [1992] 4 All ER 161, 403.  
125 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437; [2000] 3 WLR 1423. 
126 Ibid 440. 
127 Relfo v Varsani. 
128 Ibid [65]. 
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categories of legal actors enter into contracts in fundamentally different 
capacities”.129 Without dummy asset tracing, we are able to address this distinction 
directly. Rather than basing liability on a loose analogy with cases that involve a 
misdirection of trust property, C’s liability can be explained on its own terms. And 
on its own terms, Example 6 fits the model of a standard two-party restitutionary 
claim: B Co, who is made a party to the transaction effected by its agent, A, can set 
the contract aside and recover money paid to C as an unjust enrichment at its 
expense.  
If we adopt this approach, a great deal turns on whether or not the transaction 
was authorised, which question was altogether ignored in BCCI v Akindele. If the 
directors were authorised to execute the transaction, there should have been no 
question of the company seeking to claim back the funds paid; if they were not, the 
company could have set aside the contract and sought restitution.  
 
STRICT LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 
 
It remains to address Example 5, in which strict liability has been founded upon 
the receipt of a notional asset owned by the claimant at law: 
 
Example 5: A fraudulently diverts £10 from B’s account to A’s 
account. A then transfers £10 to C from that account. 
 
These cases are the most important casualty of the decision to replace dummy 
asset tracing: C, who neither participates in the fraud through which B’s funds were 
misdirected, nor transacts directly with B, ought not to be made accountable for B’s 
loss; B’s proper defendant is A.130  
Not all of our decisions on so-called “common law tracing” will be undermined 
by this conclusion. If we can find an explanation for the firm’s proprietary claim to 
the cash held by Cass in Lipkin Gorman, we might be able to explain the casino’s 
liability for the cash that it received from Cass. That liability, if it can be justified, 
must be in the nature of a trust, and the casino’s liability for the receipt of trust 
property. But two decisions that have been considered crucial to the development 
of principles of common law tracing are undermined by the departure from dummy 
asset tracing: in Trustee of FC Jones v Jones and Banque Belge pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck, 
neither defendant should have been liable (for the original sum received or for 
profits made by investing it) to a claimant with whom they did not transact, and 
against whom they committed no primary or participatory wrong. 
 
 
                                                      
129 M Conaglen and R Nolan, ‘Contracts and knowing receipt: principles and application’’ LQR 359. 
130 I have assumed support for the requirement of directness in unjust enrichment. For contrary views see 
e.g. S. Watterson, ‘"Direct Transfers" in the Law of Unjust Enrichment ’ (2011) 64 CLP 435. 
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COMMON LAW TRACING 
 
It should be clear that a by-product of the analysis in this article is that there is no 
role for “common law tracing” within or without the context of bank transfers. I 
have presented the case for eliminating dummy asset tracing, and have suggested 
that exchange product tracing ought only to deliver a proprietary claim in the nature 
of a trust.  
However, we must be careful not to make too much of this conclusion. There 
have been many arguments to the effect that a corollary of the loss of a distinct law 
of tracing at common law is the loss of any distinct role for fiduciary duties in 
establishing a connection between old and new assets.131 Yet, quite apart from 
reducing the importance of fiduciary duties, replacing dummy asset tracing may 
place a renewed emphasis on the status of the party responsible for the loss. There 
may well be an argument from fiduciary responsibility for allowing a beneficiary to 
“cherry-pick” the product of an unauthorised investment made by the trustee, 
which does not also require us to treat the account as a corporeal confusion of 
funds; such an argument would necessitate careful consideration of the scope and 
form of the core custodial duty.  
This is what we gain by replacing dummy asset tracing, and it warrants 
emphasis: arguments that concern the existence and extent of liability cannot be 
made by simple analogy with cash transfers; rather, they must be made with clear 
reference to the role of the defendant in instigating the loss for which the claimant 
sues, and the contours of the relationship between them.  
 
 
VII.CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that tracing money through bank transfers is a process distinct from 
tracing through substitutions, which we have called “exchange product tracing”. A 
claimant who traces through bank payments and claims in equity does so on the 
basis of a notional rights-transfer; a claimant who traces through bank payments 
and claims at law does so on the basis of a notional transfer of some physical thing. 
I have called these processes “dummy asset tracing”.  
I have demonstrated that dummy asset tracing has important third party 
consequences: it permits a claimant to connect her account (from which funds were 
wrongfully debited) with the account of an innocent third party (into which funds 
have been credited), for the purposes of establishing a claim to the latter. I have 
argued that we should articulate the defendant’s role in that misallocation of funds 
more clearly, and that so doing presents a narrower account of liability: the 
defendant is liable either because she actuated or participated in a breach of some 
                                                      
131 See e.g. Smith. 
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duty owed to the claimant, or because the claimant’s agent lacked the authority to 
effect the bank transfer to her.  
